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FORUM ON PUBLIC POLICY 
BEYOND INFORMED CITIZENS: WHO ARE ‘THE WISE’? 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
by Thomas Hughson* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the early 1990’s, there has been “an explosion of interest in the concept 
of citizenship among political theorists.”1 Taking for granted a large measure of 
justice in the basic institutions constituting a liberal democracy, theorists 
looked to citizens as the key to a successfully functioning democracy.2 For, as 
German philosopher Jürgen Habermas observed, “the institutions of 
constitutional freedom are only worth as much as a population makes of 
them.”3  Moreover, theorists of citizenship agreed that, “…the health and 
stability of a modern democracy depends not only on the justice of its ‘basic 
structure’ but also on the qualities and attitudes of its citizens.”4 The ‘informed 
citizen’ is an ideal-typical person competent to participate in democratic self- 
governance. Informed citizens, it seems, are those who not only have acquired 
enough information on democratic institutions and current affairs to vote 
deliberately but also those who have sufficient civic virtue to look beyond 
private interests to a common good. 
 
 
 
 
 
____________________ 
* Professor, Marquette University  
 
 
                                                 
1 Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, “Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work 
on Citizenship Theory,” in Ethics 104 (January, 1994): 352-381 at 352. 
 
2See for example, besides Kymlicka and Norman, Gershon Shafir, editor, The 
Citizenship Debates: A Reader (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998); 
Paul Rogat Loeb, Soul of a Citizen: Living with Conviction in a Cynical Time (New 
York: St. Martin’s Griffin Press, 1999; Dwight D. Allman, Michael D. Beaty, editors, 
Cultivating Citizens: Soulcraft and Citizenship in Contemporary America (Lanham, 
MD: Lexington books, 2002); H. Lawrence Zillmer, “John Locke’s Social Contract 
Revisited,” Oxford University Roundtable, August 12, 2005. 
 
3 Jürgen Habermas, “Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future 
of Europe,” in Praxis International 12 (1992): 1-19 at 7, quoted by Kymlicka and 
Norman, 353.  
 
4 Kymlicka and Norman, 352/3. 
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Not least among concerns was how citizens connect religious 
convictions with civic duties.5 In the period of the United States’ founding, a 
general principle was that institutions of political self-governance depended on 
citizens having an underlying attainment of moral self-governance. Religion 
was seen as a moral tutor to the populace. The founders of the American 
republic, for example, acknowledged that religion could provide the basic 
moral education of the population. The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 provided 
for public monies to be paid to schools under religious auspices in expectation 
that their inculcating of moral values supported the stable functioning of the 
basic structures of democracy. Mainline Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish faiths 
generally have encouraged active, responsible citizenship as an ethical  
 responsibility. 
In broader perspective, Christianity has related to democracy in at least 
three other ways: 1.) as historical presupposition for specific principles 
supportive of democracy (e.g. division of temporal from spiritual authority, rule 
of law not by the arbitrary will of a ruler, consent of the governed as with the 
Magna Carta, dignity of the person as protected in “the rights of an Englishman 
prior to American independence); 2.) as impetus to democratization (Protestant: 
Reformation to present; Catholic: 1970’s to present); 3.) as public advocate on 
behalf of social justice and other aspects of civic morality (19th and 20th c. 
social teachings by various churches). These relationships all conceive the 
existence of the state as a creaturely reality subordinate to, and not fully 
embodying, a transcendent frame of reference that serves as a standard by 
which to gauge the justice of institutions and polices. For that reason I haven’t 
isolated a separate relationship of Christianity or relation as a critic of 
government. Some would make this the main task.6  
 
                                                 
5 For example, Robert Audi and Nicholas Wolterstorff, Religion in the Public Square: 
The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate (Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 1997); Nancy L. Rosenblum, editor, Obligations of Citizenship and 
Demands of Faith: Religious Accommodation in Pluralist Democracies (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2000); Christopher Eberle, Religious Convictions in Liberal 
Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).  Gerald S. Vigna, “Can We 
Teach for Citizenship? Religiously Affiliated Colleges and Public Virtues,” Oxford 
University Roundtable, August 9, 2005; Andrew J. Waskey, “Religion and Education in 
American Constitutional Law: Past, Present, and Developing Trends,” Oxford 
University Roundtable, August 11, 2005. 
 
6 See for example, in differing ways, Stanley Hauerwas and William H. Willimon, 
Resident Aliens: Life in the Christian Colony (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1989) and 
Stephen L. Carter, The Culture of Disbelief: How American Law and Politics Trivialize 
Religious Devotion (New York: Basic Books, 1993). 
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THE TASK OF WISDOM 
 
The question of wisdom begins to emerge in recognition that all of these 
relationships involve more or less actively considered reference to the end or 
purpose of human existence. Wisdom orders activities and knowledge to this 
supreme good and plenitude of being. In launching a liberal democracy, for 
example, the founders of the American republic, along with political and legal 
judgments on the constitutional framework and exact institutional procedures of 
democracy, worked from judgments that related the purpose of the new 
government to the divine origin and goal of human existence.  The Declaration 
of (political) Independence from the British crown also declared national and 
individual (religious) dependence on the Creator. Ordering the religious and the 
political religious and political dimensions of human existence belongs to 
wisdom. In fact, once Christianity gets underway there is no escaping this task.  
And so the New Testament already begins to consider how Christians are to 
live two kinds of citizenship, one earthly, the other heavenly. The starting-point 
is the clear, practical, and definitive priority of ‘citizenship’ in heaven (Phil. 
3:20).7 On a theoretical level this will come to mean ordering also the different 
kinds of knowledge theology and political reflection, involved in understanding 
God and the state.  
From the side of Christianity, revealed divine wisdom provides truth by 
which to order other kinds of knowledge. One truth that becomes an ordering 
principle is that the content of faith exceeds, fulfills, and may correct what can 
be known from reason based in human experience. The font of wisdom for 
Christianity is Christ and the Holy Spirit, their missions, and New Testament 
witness to them, as well tradition coming from them. What many consider the 
chief contribution of Christianity to the political order was precisely the 
religion/state differentiation that was the heritage out of which issued First 
Amendment no-establishment, to become known later as ‘separation of church 
and state’. This proceeded from the surpassing reality of God’s Kingdom. 
Christ’s whole reality and communicable wisdom led into a central wise 
judgment ordering the religious and political dimensions of Christian existence. 
It was a new dualism: Caesar was not God, Christ is Lord; obligations to the 
state and government are subordinate to God and gospel. There were two chief 
authorities in this world, not one all-encompassing political authority that 
amalgamates relations with the divine into governance of the Empire, kingdom, 
duchy, etc. In the church Christianity introduced a new social yet not territorial 
presence of divine authority, with a claim to freedom, an assertion of 
                                                 
7 “For Paul and the early church, the Christian’s true citizenship belongs in the kingdom 
of God.” Walter E. Pilgrim, Uneasy Neighbors: Church and State in the New Testament  
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1999): 33. 
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independence from political authorization, and ready to make moral or spiritual 
judgments on aspects of political governance.8  
Though far from the advent of democracy, in principle this spelled the 
end of theocracy. Whether it was an Egyptian Pharoah, some Hellenistic kings, 
Caesar Augustus, or the Zealot ideal of a restored Jewish kingdom, Christianity 
was incompatible with a supreme governing authority that was received and 
revered as the central representative of the divine to people in a society.9 The 
central representative of God was Christ. His ambassadors, or apostles, shared 
his sovereignty. Their pastoral authority to govern within the churches did not 
stem from a source outside Christ, such as existing religious or civil 
authorities.10 The effect of this was to limit monarchy to the political realm, 
though clarity on the political/religious border was historically gained from 
experience, trial and error. Nonetheless, it has to be admitted that from 
Constantine on, there have been Christian rulers who have understood their 
governance as a God-given sovereignty extending to at least some elements of 
religion if not all of it. 
It would seem that Christianity and democracy have in common a 
principle of opposition to organizing the political life of a people in a theocratic 
way.  Christianity prolongs Christ’s unique claim to sovereignty outside and 
above all political claims, including any professing to represent God. 
Democracy opposes theocracy because it assumes that the divine is accessible 
to all the people ruled as well as to the ruler: vox populi vox Dei. This has not 
been self-evident in all contexts. 11 Can autocracy or theocracy have legitimacy 
if there is general belief that vox populi vox Dei? Christianity’s eventual 
                                                 
8 Edward Schillebeeckx points out that the New Testament churches had an interest in 
the transformation of social structures toward love and justice, but had no practical 
position of influence on the institutional structures of the Roman Empire and so built up 
the church as an alternative society animated (not perfectly) by the values of the gospel. 
Internal focus was appropriate until such time as Christians gained influence in political 
society. Christ: The Experience of Jesus as Lord, translated by John Bowden (New 
York: Crossroad Publishing, 1981): 561 ff.  
 
9 Oscar Cullmann’s The State in the New Testament (London: SCM Press, 1957) 
emphasizes, indeed overemphasizes, Jesus’ opposition to the Zealots. 
10 Pilgrim, ch. 3. 
 
11 This includes reverence for autocracy as an indivisible share in divine sovereignty. 
Ivan the Terrible of Russia (1533-84), for example, abhorred the Latin West for its 
principle of the consent of the governed. “Their rulers do not rule, they follow the 
directions of their subjects. Russian rulers by contrast do not follow the whim of their 
nobles and aristocrats, they are sovereign.” More, failure to practice indivisible 
sovereignty was a sign of Western Godlessness. Sergei Filatov and Lyudmila 
Vorontsova, “Russian Catholicism: Relic or Reality?” in John Witte, Jr. and Michael 
Bordeaux, editors, Proselytism and Orthodoxy in Russia: The New War for Souls 
(Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1999): 93-107 at 95. This stark alternative to the 
Western tradition of the Magna Carta is best understood in light of Constantine. 
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secularization of political authority as the ‘temporal power’ has had the 
consequence that Christians, above all in democracies, have to think about how 
to relate religious and political life.  This includes relating, ordering, the 
different ways of knowing that pertain to the temporal, political realm and to 
ultimate, comprehensive principles from faith. That relating of different kinds 
of knowing in light of the ultimate end of human existence, communion with 
God, is a task that Thomas Aquinas located within the purview of wisdom. It is 
a difficult task, which may be why even churches and all of us may stumble in 
carrying it out. 
 
EXPANDING MURRAY’S ANSWER TO A QUESTION ABOUT WISDOM 
 
In turning to John Courtney Murray (1904-67) I’d like to raise a question about 
whether or not, and how, Christianity can be a source of wisdom for citizens in 
a democracy, and not only a wisdom influential in the original shaping of 
democratic institutions.12 This heads in a direction opposed by some today, 
most notably perhaps theologian Stanley Hauerwas, who do not want 
Christianity or the churches reduced to American democracy’s aide-de-camp. 
And that is right. However, and contrarily, I don’t think respect for the state and 
for offering Christian perspectives that assist its greater fidelity to a God-given 
purpose of securing the temporal common good reduces Christianity or a 
church to the state’s lackey, or leads Christians to become uncritical 
cheerleaders for a given state or a given policy.13 This is also to say that I don’t 
interpret the current condition of American democracy amid an unjust war to 
pose a simple either/or to faith obliging it to a wholesale “no,” as if the invasion 
of Iraq put churches in a status confessionis like the Third Reich did in 
Germany. Were that the situation only a resounding “no” to the government 
would express the fundamental obligation of the churches to their own 
independence in forming an ethical judgment on the invasion of Iraq. A 
concern for the wisdom of citizens would then be superfluous to resistance. 
Murray was an American Catholic theorist on church-state and 
religious liberty themes, most known for assisting the production of the 
Declaration on Religious Liberty at Vatican II, and for a 1960 book, We Hold 
                                                 
12 One of the best introductions to Murray remains Donald E. Pelotte John Courtney 
Murray: Theologian in Conflict (New York: Paulist Press, 1976). For a bibliography of 
Murray’s writings, see “Works by John Courtney Murray, S.J.,” in J. Leon Hooper, 
S.J., editor, Bridging the Sacred and the Secular: Selected Writings of John Courtney 
Murray, S.J. (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1994): 343-355. 
 
13 If Romans 13: 1 ff. has been taken by some Christians to demand unquestioning 
compliance with any and every government and policy, contemporary exegesis 
removes the possibility of perpetuating that mistake. See Pilgrim, and Richard Horsely, 
Paul and Empire: Religion and Power in Roman Imperial Society (Harrisburg, PA: 
Trinity Press International, 1997) that situate Paul’s affirmation of civil authority within 
conditional not absolute acceptance. 
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These Truths: Catholic Reflections on the American Proposition.14 Martin 
Marty, prolific analyst of American religion and Professor Emeritus at the 
University of Chicago Divinity School, refers to Murray as “one of the great 
theorists of republican existence.”15  Murray raised the question about wisdom 
in analyzing how citizens applied basic morality to complicated new 
situations.16 Most grasped basic moral norms in their recurrent applications. 
But complex, new moral questions demanded increased knowledge and subtle 
reflection. Those citizens capable of this were, when moved by a dispassionate 
love for truth and an interest in the common good, ‘the wise’. Most people and 
citizens appreciated the prohibition against theft, for example, but relatively 
few were able to move from basic justice to a just settlement of a wage dispute 
in a modern economy. That was the province of the wise. 
Who were they? Murray’s answer was less helpful than his question. 
He looked to the academy, the legal profession, and top journalists, to experts 
in economics, law, government, and public consensus. In the illustrative case of 
a wage dispute, he did not look to the workers or their union representatives. 
Nor did he expect wisdom on national affairs or economic justice from 
churches. Their province was the deposit of faith; their wisdom pertained to the 
gospel as a means of personal salvation not of social order. But this fairly 
secular, top-down, experts-only approach ignored a source of wisdom known to 
the ancient Greek tragedians, and developed by Black and liberation theologies. 
The Greek axiom had been, pathos esti mathos, that is, suffering is or brings 
understanding. Black and liberation theologies have identified what is often 
spoken of as the hermeneutical privilege of the poor. A person’s or a people’s 
suffering from poverty, marginalization, or other vulnerability is an experiential 
ground for the insight into justice or injustice of societal arrangements not as 
easily accessible to those more favorably placed. Christopher Rowland 
remarks, “The oppressed call into question assumptions about the character of 
human relationships, both local and international, in a suffering and unjust 
world.” 17 James Cone’s Black liberation theology addresses systemic racism in 
American culture whereas most white Americans see only isolated, 
disconnected, sporadic incidents springing from overt prejudice in specific 
                                                 
 
14 John Courtney Murray, We Hold These Truths: Catholic Reflections on the American 
Proposition (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1960).  
 
15 Martin Marty with Jonathan Moore, Religion, Politics, and the Common Good: 
Advancing a Distinctly American Conversation About Religion’s Role in Our Shared 
Life (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2000): 16. 
 
16 Murray, “The Origins and Authority of the Public Consensus: A Study of the 
Growing End,” in We Hold These Truths, 97-123. 
17 Christopher Rowland, “Introduction: the theology of liberation,” in Christopher 
Rowland, editor, The Cambridge Companion to Liberation Theology (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999): 1-16 at 7. 
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individuals. Insight into the systemic presence of racism comes easily to those 
burdened by its effects.18 
Who, then, are the wise? Liberation and Black theologies have given 
reason to think that the voices of the poor, marginalized, and vulnerable are a 
potential source of wisdom about public policies and institutions, especially 
those that affect them. Duncan B. Forrester, Professor Emeritus of Theology 
and Public Issues at the University of Edinburgh, has come to a view open to 
this conclusion.  He expresses it in a negative form stating that, “It is dangerous 
to believe that people from the academy, from the civil service, and from the 
educated elite are able to read the Christian tradition with objectivity, and 
decide what is good for the people.”19 Forrester’s remark directs attention to a 
reading of Christian tradition in relation to society that has some connection 
with the lives and views of those least able to exert political influence. He did 
not include the churches among those deciding what’s good for people over 
their heads. In fact, most churches have a heritage of grass-roots contact with 
the poor, marginalized, and vulnerable among their own membership and their 
fellow citizens. This, together with teaching on the social implications of the 
gospel, qualifies the churches to speak from, with, and to some extent for, those 
with least political voice.  
At the same time, British theologian and Canon of Manchester 
Cathedral, John Atherton is surely correct to emphasize the political as distinct 
from economic aspect of concern for the poor, marginalized, and vulnerable.20 
This is the meaning of that concern as expansion of the inclusiveness of 
democracy, that all voices not only those of the powerful, well educated, etc. 
are heard.21 It does not amount to denying the urgency, that is, of economic 
development requiring skills, knowledge, and principles of activity other than 
solidarity with the poor. In a parallel way, Black liberation theology’s critique 
of systemic racism has to incorporate attention to the complexity of individuals’ 
                                                 
 
18James Cone, The Risks of Faith: The Emergence of a Black Theology of Liberation, 
1968-1998 (Boston: Beacon Press, 2000). 
 
19 Duncan B. Forrester, “The Scope of Public Theology,” in Elaine L. Graham and 
Esther D. Reed, editors, The Future of Christian Social Ethics: Essays on the Work of 
Ronald H. Preston 1913-2001 (London: Continuum, 2004): 5-19 at 12. Special issue of 
Studies in Christian Ethics 17, 2.  
 
20 In the context of the liberation theology movement Jose Comblin does not hesitate to 
assert that, “[t]he greatest flaw in Latin American nations is the lack of citizenship. 
Only a minority follows the life of the nation…Transforming inhabitants into citizens–
that is the challenge.” Called for Freedom: The Changing Context of Liberation 
Theology, translated by Philip Berryman (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1998): 123. 
 
21 John Atherton, Public Theology for Changing Times (London: SPCK Press, 2000).  
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lives. British author and expert in education Robert Jackson makes a valuable 
point: 
 
It also needs to be recognized that minority cultures, 
religions, and ethnicities are themselves internally 
pluralistic, and the symbols and values associated of their 
various constituent groups are open to negotiation, contest, 
and change. Moreover, individuals from any background 
may identify with values associated with a range of sources 
and may draw eclectically on a variety of resources in 
creating a new culture.22  
 
James Cone tackles this with his analysis of the diverse stances on racism 
among African-Americans, with some inclined toward Dr. Martin Luther King, 
Jr. socio-political dream, and others attracted to the militant struggle against 
cultural racism initiated by Malcolm X. For Cone the two tendencies are 
compatible and mutually enriching. So correcting Murray’s narrowness in 
answering the question– who are the wise?– does not entail rejecting those he 
identified as ‘the wise’, just widening the circle to include the poor, 
marginalized, vulnerable, and the churches. 
 
THE CONDITION FOR A CONTRIBUTION 
 
I propose that the churches can contribute wisdom in three ways to citizens in a 
democracy. However, their contribution depends on prior comprehension 
gained from social analysis that the churches as a whole or singly are not in a 
position to mold the basic institutions of modern or post-modern Western 
societies. This possibility may be available where nation building is still 
underway, as in Nigeria and other nations in Africa, and possibly in Russia. But 
the processes of secularization already have pre-defined the public space 
churches can occupy in, for example, the US or Europe. According to Jose 
Casanova’s Public Religions in the Modern World the differentiation of the 
major activities of human life into autonomous zones has the consequence that 
either churches acquiesce in structural pressure to become zones of privatized 
religiosity without interest in or impact on public life, or they adopt a prophetic 
role.23 Casanova’s originality lies in distinguishing the tendency toward 
privatization of religion from the larger hypothesis that proposes a gradual 
extinction of religion as modernity advances. He endorses the former and 
remarks on the lost credibility of the latter. He accepts the tendency precisely as 
                                                 
22 Robert Jackson, Rethinking Religious Education and Plurality: Issues in Diversity 
and  Pedagogy (London: RoutledgeFalmer, 2004): 130. 
 
23Jose Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1994).  
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that, a drift, and a structural orientation toward limiting religion to domestic and 
personal privacy. But this is not a matter of removing an option for public 
influence placed before religions. Churches confront a crossroads not anything 
inevitable. The processes of secularization and modernization do not squeeze 
out of existence all possibilities for the public influence of Christianity in 
democracies. An option for a prophetic public role remains.  
This is to abandon the central, legitimating role of the churches in 
Christendom that underwrote the moral legitimacy of basic institutions. It is to 
take up a role of bearing Christian witness to the Godward purpose of human 
existence.  This consists in publicly challenging an absolutizing tendency in any 
or all of the spheres differentiated by modernity into autonomous realms—the 
state, economy, science, and education-- to represent and direct the totality of 
human existence. True, in this condition religion, Christianity, and the 
churches, is one among the spheres rather than being the fullest source of truth, 
meaning, and value authorizing all institutions. Modernity has bracketed the 
major activities of life from their sacred center and spiritual depth. But the 
center and depth exist in individual persons, and have social visibility in the 
churches. In this sense churches are public witnesses to the center and depth of 
human persons and to the orientation of all created reality to the Creator. In the 
modern and post-modern context religion is like the core of a circle, one space 
among many, yet central. Prophetic participation in public life by the churches 
means entrance into the deliberative processes of democracy instead of direct 
jurisdiction over the political or economic orders. Of course, there is no 
guarantee of success, as the White House’s dismissal of the nearly unanimous 
condemnation by church leaders in the US of the plan to invade Iraq shows. 
 
BRINGING MORAL WISDOM INTO PUBLIC DELIBERATIONS: A 
PROPHETIC ROLE 
 
From a position of prophetic presence, then, churches can make a difference in 
the public life of a modern democracy by introducing the moral wisdom that 
comes from judging policies and institutions in light of God as origin and goal 
of all finite, created existence, and in light more particularly of the Incarnation 
in which God made a lasting new covenant with creation, including nature, 
family life, economic activities, political life, cultural and artistic activities, etc, 
as John Atherton emphasizes in Public Theology for Changing Times. Churches 
have a tradition of doing just this in Britain and in the US. But the contribution 
most often occurs in the form of moral judgments on specific public problems 
or issues, and so the aspect of wisdom identified by Murray goes unnoticed. A 
pastoral letter on economic justice, for example, performs an office of wisdom 
by challenging the impression that economic activity does not depend on 
human decisions and value judgments but instead simply adheres to a 
cost/benefit calculus accepted as the immanent norm for sound economic 
decisions. The wisdom consists in clarifying the options built into an economic 
system as well as its cultural and moral premises, and relating the goal of 
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economics to the goal of human life rather than submitting to a regime in which 
the economic system has such autonomy and absoluteness that no one dare 
modify it in a more human, Christian direction by introducing an option for the 
poor for example.  
It would be an advantage to public discussion and to the credibility of 
the churches if their moral statements more clearly identified the multiple 
sources of information, knowledge, and principle actually woven together in 
public moral positions. In a recent essay, Atherton comments on the importance 
of religious communities learning how to “express…religiously informed 
convictions in increasingly plural public contexts.”24  One approach is to think 
through the components—strictly religious principle, experiential knowledge, 
scientific understanding, other secular sources⎯entering into a moral judgment 
on a public matter. Robert Audi argues in a book co-authored with Nicholas 
Wolterstorff, Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions 
in Political Debate, that the virtue of civility asks that religious arguments 
identify where possible the secular or scientific or common sense grounds that 
also help form a moral conclusion, in addition to its deductive derivation from a 
religious authority.25 This does not bar religious language and argument from 
the public square but it does take account of the fact that the political 
community is not a religious community, that not all will understand particular 
beliefs or values, that making discourse accessible to a heterogeneous public is 
appropriate to the deliberative processes of democracy.  
Being forthright about the complex nature of moral judgment would be 
a way to lift the wisdom aspect of the churches’ contribution to the level of 
explicit recognition. In fact, since wisdom orders various kinds of knowledge in 
reference to the goal or purpose of human existence, it belongs to wisdom to be 
clear about the presence of many kinds of knowledge co-present in an astute 
moral judgment on a public policy. To put it another way, and in traditional 
language, since most morality combines faith and reason, it behooves churches 
to be clear that, and to communicate that, they have consulted both. Unless this 
is articulated, a public not sharing the churches’ beliefs most likely will receive 
pronouncements from religious sources in a fideistic way that assumes the 
language of faith has nothing in common with what reason can arrive at. Post-
modern awareness of the particularity in all meta-narratives, including that of 
progressive secular rationality, dovetails with traditional Christian affirmation 
of the complementarity of faith and reason. Atherton remarked that it is 
                                                 
24 Atherton,  “Marginalisation, Manchester, and the Scope of Public Theology,” in 
Elaine L. Graham and Esther D. Reed, editors, The Future of Christian Social Ethic, 
20-36 at 32. 
 
25 Robert Audi and Nicholas Wolterstorff, Religion in the Public Square: The Place of 
Religious Convictions in Political Debate (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997). 
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objectionable to assume that, “faith or reason alone is necessary for 
understanding of the contemporary situation and problems.” 26 
 
CONTRIBUTING INTERPRETATIVE WISDOM  
 
Bearing witness to the social ethics of Christianity and the gospel, for example, 
is a way of contributing wisdom to the public life of democracy. This helps 
keep the deliberative processes of democracy accountable to the larger human 
purposes of the state that coincide to a significant degree with the demands of 
human rights. Churches as well as individuals have the freedom and right to 
speak on public policies from a religious perspective and to recommend the 
advantages of their perspective for the common good. Usually this amounts to 
persuasion for or against a particular law or policy. This is to advocate a 
specific regulatory effect. This can leave churches open to the reproach of 
seeking to impose their beliefs. 
Yet, there’s another way churches can contribute wisdom to 
democracy. They can nurture wisdom in their members.. This means reframing 
issues and problems so that their own members see the fuller significance. This 
is not so much to instruct consciences in moral wisdom as to undertake a more 
fundamental interpretation of the correlation between religious ideas and socio-
political institutions and ideas. This puts members in a position to initiate an 
entrance into the deliberative processes of democracy on their own and to 
provoke inquiry into more than what’s right or wrong. At present a realistic 
way the churches can take on the task of reframing issues is to listen to their 
own public theologians. The testing question of a practical sort is, what are the 
lay ministers, the clergy, the pastors, the bishops, and other church leaders 
reading? Have they engaged the thought of public theologians like Murray, 
Reinhold Niebuhr, Kenneth and Michael Himes, John Atherton, along with 
European political theologians like Jürgen Moltmann, Black theologians like 
James Cone, and liberation theology? All examine correlations between the 
religious ideas and the socio-political institutions of a given era and cultural 
context. 
I suggest that public theology also can be understood to be an 
exploration of the lived synthesis of faith and citizenship on the basis of the 
primacy of the spiritual. It recognizes that in the West most people, even in a 
secularized Europe, believe in God and a spiritual dimension in life, though 
smaller percentages may be regular churchgoers.27 That means most are 
believer/citizens. Public theology remembers whatever in Christian tradition–
Scripture, Church Fathers, worship, preaching, theology, example of holy 
persons, art, practice, cultural mores–illuminates the lived simultaneity of being 
                                                 
26 Atherton, Public Theology for Changing Times, 85. 
 
27 See Andrew M. Greeley, Religion in Europe at the End of the Second Millenium 
(London: Transaction Publishers, 2004). 
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a believer and being a citizen. This approach, an initial development of which 
was given in The Believer as Citizen: John Courtney Murray in a New Context, 
moves theology from the realm of theory into the realm of interiority.28 An 
objection to this approach as individualistic can be sustained only on the 
individualistic assumption, not made here, that persons are not inherently 
relational but atomistic, as if relationships were not part of interiority but only 
external realities acquired by deliberate choice. 
An approach to faith and citizenship through the realm of interiority is 
to follow Bernard Lonergan’s analysis, outlined in his Method in Theology, of 
progress in understanding from the realm of common sense to that of theory 
and on to that of interiority.29 Common sense describes the world as it affects 
us. Scripture is primarily common sense in describing events and realities. 
Theory advances to an explanation of how elements in reality relate to each 
other. This occurred in the early Councils that settled disputes on the divinity 
and humanity of Christ and the persons in the Trinity. Interiority is self-
appropriation, analysis, and articulation of the conscious activities that underlie 
theory and common sense. Those activities are essentially paying attention, 
inquiring into the meaning of what experience brings to attention, coming to 
careful judgments of truth and value from the ideas and hypotheses generated 
by inquiry, and responsible decision in light of truth and value. This is, so far, 
methodological rather than substantive. 
 
 
FROM CHURCH AND STATE TO FAITH AND CITIZENSHIP 
 
Let me conclude by providing a substantive example of a turn to interiority in 
the relationship of Christianity to democracy. This amounts to reframing public, 
external norms for church/state relations in terms of their interior reality as 
principles in self-understanding. Church/state relations evoke images of past 
powers-that-be in relationship to the topmost levels of churches’ authorities: 
struggles between popes and emperors or kings, bishops or pastors with 
princes; collaboration between these highest levels in legal establishment. But 
since in a democracy the primary public office is that of citizen, from the 
viewpoint of democracy the primary point of contact between church and state 
occurs in the consciences and self-understandings of believer/citizens. Each 
believer/citizen is a church/state relationship. The relationship exists as a result 
of simultaneous participation in Christian faith and in a democratic state. Public 
theology inquires into how believer/citizens coordinate both participations. It 
can help identify and articulate that coordination of faith and citizenship while 
keeping it accountable to Christian sources. The state, with law, coercive 
                                                 
28 Thomas Hughson, S.J., The Believer as Citizen: John Courtney Murray in a New 
Context (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1993). 
 
29 Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology (New York: The Seabury Press, 1972). 
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power, and prepossessing public presence usually keeps citizens accountable to 
democratic institutions and principles. 
Four theoretical principles distill modern Catholic understanding of 
church/state relations. In explaining these to graduate students from other 
Christian traditions I have found that they find them congenial in general yet 
wish to reformulate them. So I present the principles in an ecumenical spirit for 
dialogue, not unilaterally as if self-evidently compelling as formulated. The 
first principle is that there is an irreducible difference in the respective origins, 
activities, and purposes of state and church. The state originates immediately in 
created human nature and its capacity to devise reasonable modes of 
cooperation and decision-making, and through that the state ultimately springs 
from and expresses the wisdom of the Creator. In Lutheran terms the state 
belongs to God’s work through the law, not the gospel. In Reformed terms the 
state or political order is an order of creation.  
The now divided Church of all the baptized originated in the missions 
of Christ and the Holy Spirit that introduce a reality over and above the best 
capacities of creation and that can redeem their fallenness. The interior reality is 
that faith is a divine gift underived from any political regime, heritage, or 
authority and therefore independent of them. Faith, conversion, and baptism are 
also a liberation from slavery to personal and original sin. No political authority 
or institution brings about this fundamental reconciliation with God and other 
human beings. Moreover, faith is part of what the Holy Spirit communicates 
and another element is Christian freedom in the mode of love for God and 
neighbor as well as a desire to communicate the gospel. Evangelization 
continually arises from a divine gift not from a state’s directives or 
authorization. This grounds the personal and ecclesial demand for freedom to 
evangelize realized, but only partially, through the human right to religious 
liberty. The state does not have, nor can it legitimately acquire from the 
religious convictions of its citizens, a religious mission. The flourishing, or not, 
of Christianity stems from the vitality, or not, of the churches. It does not fall to 
the state to act as an instrument or advocate of faith by seeking means to 
promote a Christian nation-state, for example. 
Citizenship, then, does not ground Christian freedom. But it does 
institute the basis for legal protection of citizens’ human rights, including the 
right to religious liberty. Citizenship, though, has an ultimately divine origin in 
the created order and is a human ordering of social existence that, whether 
acknowledged as such or not, reflects the relationship of humanity to the 
Creator. That would seem to preclude anarchism from among political options 
compatible with Christian faith. Also, because citizenship specifies a 
universally human political attribute, its meaning exceeds the particularity of a 
national society and state. The universality of the human always has only 
particular political arrangements but none of them eclipse the reality of a 
common humanity. It seems to be a distorted understanding of citizenship that 
produces nationalism. An understanding of citizenship in light of faith does not 
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forget the universality, even if formulations of it have to be tried before the bar 
of post-modern suspicion of false (Western) universalisms. 
Likewise the democratic state does not derive from the churches or 
from faith but from created human nature and human reason, and so it has an 
independent finality not conferred by or able to be revoked by any ecclesial 
authority. The implication of significance is that faith and citizenship can be 
correlated and synthesized in thought and practice but no attempt at a complete 
identification of the two respects the difference between them. Fusions of God 
and country, faith and nationality, etc. run contrary to the nature of both and 
usually absolutize the state. God and Caesar, faith and citizenship, are not the 
same in the economy of salvation, though as Romans 13 points out, Caesar’s 
rule is under God and for divine purposes of peace and order, though certainly 
not for purposes of salvation. I wonder if pronouncements from US political 
authorities that define the significance of the life and death of US military 
personnel does not overstep the difference between citizenship and faith by 
taking over a religious duty of defining the ultimate meaning of a fallen 
soldier’s death.  
The second principle is that the spiritual, including church mission and 
ministries, has a non-juridical priority in relations with temporal authority in 
matters of a spiritual kind. This simply accepts the novelty of the Incarnation 
and mission of the Spirit and the divine authority inherent in them as a 
guideline for Christians relating to the state. The authority of faith is superior to 
the duty to the state if the two should fall into irreconcilable conflict. As Peter 
and John said, “we must obey God rather than men” (Acts 4: 19-21). Apart 
from the kind of conflict exemplified by the Confessing Church and the 
Barmen Declaration, faith enlightening reason always offers the most 
comprehensive light in which to evaluate the actions of a state. The twentieth 
century’s totalitarian governments of the right and left made a point of policies 
that subordinated faith to citizenship. Dietrich Bonhoeffer witnessed to the 
priority of faith. In less conflictual conditions, faith still offers the perspective 
within which to understand citizenship, and does not exclude the role of reason 
in this task. Here I think a mistake is to assume that the priority of faith 
typically means asserting a moral judgment without taking account of opposite 
moral judgments offered with equal integrity and the same religious liberty, and 
without adverting to the complex content of the judgment . 
Third, the state, the political order, enjoys independence from the 
official jurisdiction of any church or institutional religious authority. The state 
is not an arm of the church or an instrument of evangelization, is not charged 
with defining beliefs as valid or invalid, and is not the arbiter of religious 
values. This means that full fidelity to the priority of faith does not overrule the 
independence of the duties of a citizen. It is not part of faith to make political 
decisions that seek to cast the state with its coercive power in the role of an 
instrument or advocate of Christianity. Christian citizens who do so reproduce 
the same error made by governments that have sought to enforce religious 
beliefs. I would add that it is my opinion that this means bishops in my 
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communion who use the public language of command to members of their 
flock in regard to a moral aspect of public policy blur the difference between 
faith and citizenship. I don’t think any church authority can command any 
political decision, though teaching is always appropriate. 
The fourth principle, and possibly the most controversial ecumenically, 
is that church and state, faith and citizenship, have an inherent finality toward 
some manner of cooperation or harmony so that believer/citizens can fulfill 
their dual responsibilities. Worthy authors from Stephen Carter to Stanley 
Hauerwas insist on the importance not of harmony but of readiness to dissent 
from, challenge, and refuse to cooperate with any government policy or action 
not in line with Christian faith and morality. I agree, and yet think that this 
negative moment is precisely for the sake of just policies and actions that 
people of faith can cooperate with. The principle of harmony is not passivity or 
abject submission to the state.  It too accepts Revelation 13 on the latent 
possibility that any political authority may become oppressive and so anti-
Creator in one respect or another, no less than it holds to Romans 13 on all 
political authority coming from God. So I would say that faith seeks a way to 
cooperate with the best of citizenship, criticizes the worst, and does so in the 
redemptive prospect of correcting the fallenness of the political order rather 
than in arrival at a final condemnatory judgment in an apocalyptic perspective. 
That is to say that faith can connect with citizenship in a spirit of Christian hope 
for harmony between faith and citizenship. 
A valuable task for public theology is articulating the kinds and 
nuances of this hope. It may envision that state as serviceable to revealed, 
redemptive ends. For example, as far as I can tell, in Britain, unlike the US in 
this regard, there is no obvious millenarian backdrop to political hopes for a 
more just future. Still, Jürgen Moltmann has argued that millenarian hope for 
Christ’s earthly reign animated the energetic origins of European modernity.30 
This would mean that a diffuse millenarian hope entered Britain too. I don’t 
know if or how that is so. How might those presuppositions have influenced the 
horizon of modernity within which economic and political progress in Britain 
was conceived? 31 At the least Moltmann’s argument leads to realization that 
postmodern critiques of the Enlightenment as the source of an untenable 
modern idea of unilinear progress toward an earthly utopia are incomplete until 
they come to grips with millenarian presuppositions.  
 
                                                 
30 Jürgen Moltmann, God for a Secular Society: The Public Relevance of Theology, 
translation by Margaret Kohl (London: SCM Press, 1999).  
31 See the presentation by Robert John Arias, “Teaching the End, and the Ends of 
Teaching: Problems Surrounding Theological Instruction on the Apocalypse,” Oxford 
University Roundtable, August 11, 2005 on the impetus to scientific and technological 
innovation from apocalyptic and millenarian expectations. Also, on the compatibility of 
millenarianism and technology, see Victoria Rosenholtz, “American Fundamentalism in 
the Independent Baptist Tradition: Sectarian Education in a Globalized World,” Oxford 
University Roundtable, August 12, 2005. 
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FORMAL EDUCATION: A THIRD CONTRIBUTION TO CITIZENS 
 
Finally and most briefly, churches contribute wisdom to citizens in a 
democracy by furnishing means whereby they may seek wisdom.  Support for, 
encouragement of, and sponsorship of formal education is one of the most 
significant means.  To disconnect the churches from formal education is to 
forego access to an avenue toward wisdom by acceding to a false antithesis 
between faith and reason. To stand behind education, quite apart from programs 
designed to foster civic virtue or responsible citizenship, is to keep the diverse 
fields of knowledge in at least a minimal reference to God as origin, goal, and 
supreme good of created existence. And that represents wisdom.  
 Programmatic, institutional embodiment of the search for wisdom is a 
topic for discussion. Generally, I tend to agree with Jackson that learning about 
religions fosters citizenship education. I am not competent to judge how 
appropriate and feasible his recommendations for religious education in 
Community schools in Britain may be. However, his intriguing proposal on the 
advantages to citizenship education from students’ engaging in study and 
discussion of a plurality of religions has a paradoxical application in the US.  
Multi-religious study would seem most apt as content for courses in a 
public-school curriculum not pre-committed to a religious tradition. 32 Yet, 
hyper-sensitivity to the First Amendment no-establishment clause has seemed 
to occlude this possibility from sight, despite the constitutionality of teaching 
about religion, without proselytizing, in public schools. So, and this is the 
paradox, it is more likely that Jackson’s idea could be put into place in faith-
based schools. And to my knowledge some have tried to do just that. He points 
out how productive teaching about religion in British publicly funded common 
schools can be for citizenship in a pluralist society.  He notes that, “…the skills 
of listening, negotiating and formulating a position that are part of dialogical 
approaches to R[eligious]E[ducation],” are “…essential to good citizenship.”33  
He adds that, “the skills of dealing with difference, interpreting unfamiliar 
religious language, constructive criticism of another’s stance, and personal 
reflection all contribute to education for citizenship….”34  I concur, and might 
wish to add that this could be internal to the considerations of wisdom seeking 
to order religious and political dimensions of life, and the kinds of knowledge 
appropriate to each.  
                                                 
32 See Joan J. Early, “The Positive Aspect of Secularism,” Oxford University 
Roundtable, August 8, 2005, and responses to questions for a similar perspective. Also, 
Olfat El-Mallakh, “In Search of a Religious Curriculum for the Global World,” Oxford 
University Roundtable, August 8, 2005, and Garrett C. Kenney, “Why Religion 
Matters: Perspectives on Huston Smith’s Why Religion Matters…,” Oxford University 
Roundtable, August 8, 2005. 
 
33 Jackson, 141. 
 
34 Ibid. 
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His observations, though, provoke a concluding, comparative question. 
In the United States have all of the First Amendment constitutional and legal 
instruments, along with Supreme Court decisions, that protect religious liberty 
produced a maximum scope for its free exercise?  Parents who exercise their 
religious liberty by sending their children to religiously-affiliated schools at 
their own cost in addition to dutiful payment of taxation for state-sponsored 
school systems might pause. More bluntly, have the de jure protections of free 
exercise in the United States brought about a de facto condition of free exercise 
that exceeds that of Britain (or Canada)? Could it be the case that somehow 
cultural rather than legal resources might have enabled Britain, with an 
established church and without a First Amendment, to attain a de facto 
condition of protection for free exercise in a religiously pluralist society? Have 
the First Amendment religion clauses maximized the human and civil right to 
religious liberty in a pluralist society, or secured a lesser but permanent 
threshold to it? Does American exceptionalism in regard to the First 
Amendment pertain primarily to legal instruments rather than to social 
conditions? Do British and Canadian citizens have less religious liberty than 
American citizens? 
 
